

# USNDS Summary



## WHAT'S NEW?


- The 2018 NDS emphasised the return of "Great Power Competition", the 2022 NDS continues this emphasis, but with greater awareness on combatting the threats based on experience.
- The new NDS appears to have reprioritised the threats facing the United States to a "1+1+3" construct (see right)
- The culture over the past twenty years has been to treat Russia as a nuisance but not a challenging competitor like China. This appears to have changed to a degree that Russia is considered an "acute" threat - but it is still not regarded as great a threat as China.
- The report also recognises changes in global climate and other "dangerous transboundary threats" (e.g. pandemics) "are transforming the context in which the Department operates".
- The report prioritises "recognising growing kinetic and non-kinetic threats" and the need to increase resilience.
- On the same day DoD transmitted the NDS to Congress, it also released the president's Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 budget request, requesting a \$773 billion budget for the DoD (a 2% increase after inflation). It is likely to be accepted considering broad bipartisan support for increased defence spending.

## "1 + 1 + 3"

- The new NDS has prioritised the threats facing the US to a "1+1+3" construct.
- China is described as the "most consequential strategic competitor," followed by "acute threats" from Russia, and then "persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organisations."

## THE WAY FORWARD

1. **Integrated deterrence** - Combining strength to maximum effect by "working seamlessly" across "departments, war fighting domains, theatres, and the spectrum of conflict" and utilising alliance networks.
2. **Campaigning** - Operate forces, synchronise broader DoD efforts, and align DoD activities with other instruments of national power, to undermine acute forms of competitor coercion, complicate competitors' military preparations, and "develop our own war-fighting capabilities together with Allies and partners".
3. **Building enduring advantages** - Undertaking reforms to accelerate force development, getting the technology needed more quickly, and "making investments in the extraordinary people of the DoD".



## WHERE ALBANY CAN HELP

### Strengthening ally capabilities by supporting locally-led initiatives.

- Communication between stake-holders.
- Engaging communities to create a sense of shared investment.
- E.g. Greenwich, Cactus, Darfur

### Undermining enemy information-based offensive operations

- Fact-checking initiatives
- Establishment of independent media hubs to get info into target countries.
- Lambeth, Merton, Kyrgyz

### Supporting civilian resilience efforts.

- Public awareness campaigns of influence efforts by adversarial states (dirty money, LinkedIn as a recruitment tool etc).
- CVE messaging and media training (e.g. Willow, Hornbeam, Southwark).

### Providing access to a network of experts outside the DoD silo

- Albany's extensive work in comprehensive communications gives it access to a network of contacts in a field only recently cultivated by Defense officials.
- This is especially true of China and South Asia expertise.

#### Russia

- Deter & respond to aggression against NATO
- Land- & air-centric force posture

#### Iran

- Reduced CENTCOM presence increases risk
- Mitigate risk through reliance on allies and partners

#### North Korea

- Increased I/P force posture helps deterrence
- Allies & partners to deter and respond to aggression

#### China

- US's priority threat
- Naval- and air-centric force posture
- Work w/allies and partners to deter and respond to Chinese aggression

#### Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs)

- Reduced CENTCOM presence increases risk
- Mitigate risk through OTH-CT capabilities and reliance on allies and partners