Deep into the Sahel and away from the glare of publicity that has accompanied the past six months of NATO-assisted civil war in Libya, there is a common saying with particular relevance today in the Libyan southern deserts:

“Al-ando Kalash, yakul balash – he who has a Kalash (-nikov) may eat for free.”

The cultural impetus behind this local bit of wisdom stems from many decades of instability sustained by an almost incessant list of factors that are counter-productive to long-term peace or development – chief among which is weaponisation.

Increasingly, this instability and primacy of arms will begin to impact on the democratic project which Western leaders such as David Cameron have imagined for Libya, and without the right sort of consideration and action, this will seriously impede progress.

Entrenched for the long-term

The Sahel has seen a succession of various conflicts over many long decades, including inter alia the Chadian civil wars (the Toyota Wars), rebellions in Mali and Niger, successive Darfuri conflicts, war in Algeria, and Libyan designs on the Azouzou Strip – all of which have been undergirded by Gadaffi’s peculiar brand of interference in most things, notably using the Islamic Legion.

Furthermore, it should be noted that kinship and tribal ties rarely respect any cartographical lines on maps which set out the supposed nation-states of the Sahel, and cross-border activity has been common and intense.

Add to this political marginalisation in a low-value, low-return political environment and decades of often severe drought causing the forced movement of populations in a resource-poor region, and all in all, the picture is not one that lends itself to calm transition to democracy as Cameron et al would wish.

Today’s creeping political vacuum

Libya’s (perceived and real) wealth has long made it a favoured destination for Sahelian youth with little prospects in other parts of the region, so the problems of the past will continue to make themselves felt today.

Gadaffi’s hitherto favoured tribes (in terms of cash, power and patronage) who have vainly supported him militarily now find themselves shorn of valuable cash incomes – in particular the Libyan Warfalla and Margaha tribes, and Tuaregs of various Sahelian stripes in various guises of commitment.

Realpolitik dictates that those who have lost power and patronage generated by Gadaffi’s largesse now find themselves in a vacuum where they will seek to replace it in some other way. Loyalties can be purchased in the political marketplace to those who bid most attractively.

One cannot help observe that post-Gadaffi, interest in Libya is coming from far afield – read Western companies and organisations – which on the ground becomes a commodity that can be turned into power, influence and cash in the hands of those accustomed to making best use of what little they have at their disposal.

The search for peace in Darfur and fragmentation in southern Libya

A quick comparison with Darfur in recent years is instructive. The failure in 2006 of Darfur’s peace process  to bond armed movements (often in its lowest common denominator, simply a tribe) to the wider peace process resulted in greater fragmentation of armed actors and an even greater distance to travel in terms of reconciliation and peace.

Political allegiances shifted overnight when the Abuja peace agreement was signed in May 2006 with the majority of stakeholders refusing to sign, and consequently people who had derived healthy cash incomes and political or personal influence from conflict found them abruptly cut off – so they shifted their allegiances to whoever was paying.

Similarly, the tribes of South Libya have recently had their power, influence and cash incomes dramatically reduced, and need incentivising to join a political process which must seek to enfranchise them.

Otherwise, they will behave in more or less the same way as the non-signatories and the criminal elements at their margins did in Darfur when faced with a political process that lacked [what they considered was] acceptable levels of inclusivity: that is, self-interestedly, intransigently and often violently with rent-seeking behaviour (kidnapping, militia-for-hire).

So what for democratisation in Libya?

Undeniably, the strong institutions about which democracy can coalesce are lacking in Libya. Crucial for Cameron, then – as he seems to be staking his foreign policy reputation on what he told the UN in New York is “an opportunity – and I would say a responsibility – to help them [citizens of the MENA countries]” – is to avoid jumping the gun in labelling Libya a success and get to work to ensure it.

The risks of failure are great, not to mention retrogressive. Comparisons have been made between Cameron’s speech at the UN and Tony Blair’s Chicago speech in 1999, which set out his store on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine (in fact termed by Blair as the ‘doctrine of international community’) which 12 years later the current British PM seems to be reheating.

Intervention-wise, things ended in a quagmire for Blair, to put it mildly. Cameron’s Libya project needs good stabilisation, reconciliation and communications initiatives to succeed, much less a whiff of triumphalism for a job that’s only just beginning.

Guy Gabriel, Albany Associates