As William Hague drove through Mogadishu, the first British Foreign Secretary to do so in 20 years, he personified the new spirit of cautious optimism that now surrounds the peace process there. The Chief of Staff of the Somali Army recently said that 2012 would be the

William Hague in Mogadishu. Photo courtesy Radio Bar Kulan

year of “total liberation for the whole country”.  His message predicting the demise of the al Qaeda-led insurgent group al Shabaab was delivered on the heels of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)-enabled military successes of last year, not just in the capital Mogadishu but also across key areas of South Central Somalia that were previously well beyond the writ of the government.

The conventional battle for Mogadishu is essentially over as Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and troops from AMISOM mop up remnants of al Shabaab in Deynile, the only district of the city not yet fully under their control.  Kenyan forces alongside government militias are moving towards the insurgent stronghold and main resupply port of Kismayu.  And the Ethiopians have joined the fray again, crossing the border into central Somalia capturing the town of Beletweyne and apparently intent on pushing on to secure the remaining two extremist main bases of Baidoa and Eel Buur.

But is the current optimism justified in heralding the final chapter of the insurgency, or does the Kenyan intervention and the return of the old enemy Ethiopia offer another potential lifeline to al Shabaab?

A young boy on the northern side of Bakara market near the old cigarette and match factory in northern Mogadishu. Photo: Stuart Price, Albany Associates

The reactions of ordinary Somalis to these developments seem surprising at first glance, as they have not been as overwhelmingly hostile as many pundits would have expected. Many Somalis appear to support the interventions tolerating the foreign incursions as a lesser evil than life under al Shabaab. To most casual observers of Somalia this is a particularly unexpected response, as Shabaab’s rise to dominance has always been perceived as a reaction to the previous Ethiopian invasion and occupation.  The reality is of course more complicated and belies simple analyses. For example, as the Ethiopians approached, the residents of Beletweyne were divided; some saying they would fight at all costs while others were equally clear that they were prepared to ‘support the devil’ if this meant the removal of al Shabaab.  Similarly diverse attitudes are also being expressed in favour of or against the Kenyans in the south.

These differing positions go some way to explain the contradictory responses of the TFG who have been conflicted between adverse public reaction against foreign intervention and the potential for further success against the insurgents. However, as the Kenyan and Ethiopian operations have progressed, the TFG’s position has coalesced around an African Union inspired proposal intended to provide military coherence and safeguards on Somali sovereignty. This envisages the integration of the Kenyans into an enlarged AMISOM that includes troops from Djibouti and Sierra Leone in addition to those currently deployed from Uganda and Burundi.  This increased force level will enable AMISOM to deploy across South Central Somalia and allow the Ethiopians to withdraw.  An endorsement of this plan is expected imminently from the UN Security Council, which is currently discussing a resolution that will mandate an enlarged AMISOM and the funding necessary to support it.

The commitment by Ethiopia to leave once they have been relieved by AMISOM seems to have assuaged the TFG’s and public concerns, while defeating al Shabaab remains their predominant priority. How long this lasts will largely depend on the success of the current offensives and the behavior of the troops involved. Much of the hatred of the Ethiopians was caused by their indiscriminate use of heavy weapons and attack helicopters and the number of civilian casualties this caused. There are already grumblings about the Kenyans’ use of airpower and the collateral damage caused by aerial bombing.  These will need to be addressed if they are not to lose the fragile public support that they currently enjoy.

Al Shabaab is certainly on the back foot at the moment. Defeated militarily in Mogadishu and being squeezed in their other strongholds they are riven with internal division. They are also firmly identified with a reign of terror and brutality, which they will find it difficult to recover from.  They are seen as counter cultural by traditional Sufi Somalis and, as a consequence, perceived as foreign led and inspired.  The announcement by Ayman Al-Zawarhri that al Shabaab is now formally part of al Qaeda will further reinforce this as reality and could be the final nail in their coffin. Nevertheless, they are not defeated yet. Public support is a slippery commodity, especially in Somalia and there are many things that could still go wrong and push the pendulum back the other way.

Heavy-handed or protracted military operations without improving social and economic conditions will inevitably play into the hands of the insurgency. A lack of political progress and the perception of self-serving politicians fighting amongst themselves against a background of endemic corruption and clan cronyism will also, if left unchecked, further challenge the solidarity of local support. The next six months will be key as the various Somali actors, including parliamentarians, regional leaders and clan representatives consult under the leadership of the TFG and try to agree on a constitutional framework that will allow for the election of a more legitimate and truly representative government.

But if al Shabaab is able to manufacture more chaos through Baghdad-style bombings as an alternative to direct confrontation, then it becomes even more difficult to predict the trajectory of public opinion.  No matter how brutal, some may begin to prefer
the professed purity of an al Shabaab order to the chaos they may still yet be
able to create.

Simon Haselock, Albany Associates

Since independence on 9 July 2011, South Sudan has been the subject of much donor goodwill and financial and technical support. Now some seven months on, it is clear that this has fallen far short of requirements.

The stream of headlines has been increasingly disheartening when viewed along both the North-South and the intra-communal fault lines. The disagreement between Khartoum and Juba over oil fees for transit through the north to the Red Sea has become very disruptive, causing huge financial strain on economies that are poorly equipped to withstand it.

Independence Day in South Sudan, 9 July 2011. (Photo courtesy of juggernautco.)

Furthermore and more to the point of this piece, tribal violence among communities of many states in the South – Lakes, Western Equatoria, Unity, Warrap, Jonglei – are taking a serious toll, one which severely undermines the coherence that must be central to any national project.

These are just two of the problems that could be identified.

The North-South axis can be managed; the world and its diplomats are much more experienced and geared up to intervene and mediate on a State-to-State basis.

However, when at least 37 people are killed at UN-attended peace talks in the South aimed at resolving local conflicts, as was the case in Mayendit, Unity State in early February, then things are at a low ebb.

Various factors complicate the job of resolving these conflicts. These include:

• competition has increased between traditional and emerging leadership, with traditional systems of authority challenged and becoming less coherent.

For example, the expression of power as a member of a central government, whether as an MP or local official, is a challenge to the traditional tribal leaders and structures of authority; similarly, returning soldiers from the civil war are a challenge as many feel they have earned their voice on the battlefield, which must somehow be accommodated in a tribal structure not designed for casual additions. Each represents a weakening of the leader’s authority and its sustainability.

• the failure of local reconciliation mechanisms (for multiple reasons), which in more functional times mediated competing claims to land and natural resources with much greater success.

It is worth noting, as did Douglas Johnson in his seminal The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, that grassroots rapprochement during the 1990s (in that case intended to address the SPLA-Mainstream / SPLA-Nasir split) had more success than top-down mediation. Also held up in this regard is the 1999 Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Peace Conference, held in Wunlit, Bahr el Ghazal from 27 February to 8 March 1999 under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC).

However, while incidents may seem or are portrayed as localised clashes, often there is more behind them than local disputes over resources. The bigger picture reveals wider factors at play than excessive focus on localism reveals, including inter alia centre-periphery dynamics, border issues related to resource management and nomads, other kinds of manipulation, or international pressures. The upshot of this is that understanding the terrain, planning and implementing an intervention and interpreting the results are not as simple as it may seem.

Treating each conflict in isolation is like plugging individual leaks, not tackling the source. Therefore, it is important to consider a combination of grass roots and top-down communications in tandem which speak to those who feel aggrieved enough to pick up arms and fight, for whatever reason. These individual and isolated narratives need to be superseded by the overarching national narrative, one which binds citizens under the banner of South Sudan’s national project.

Simply gathering tribal leaders together will not be enough when the buy-in of many diverse and factionalising groups is required, if South Sudan’s communities are to be reconciled with any degree of success.

Guy Gabriel, Albany Associates